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RECENT DECISIONS

seller to reduce his prices to the exact level of his low priced competitor, quality of product would be the chief factor of competition to
the benefit of the general public. This is compatible with the policy
embodied in our anti-trust laws of maintaining flexible prices within
the economy.
CONCLUSION

There is a, definite need for an amendment to the defense contained
within Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The defense should
be made available to a seller who uses price discrimination to obtain a
new customer as well as to a seller who uses such price discrimination
to retain existing customers. This writer suggests the test should be
whether the seller asserting the defense has shown his good faith in
that he acted as a reasonably prudent businesman in securing the new
buyer and was not motivated by a desire to drive competition out of
the market. Section 2(b) should also be amended to allow a seller to
meet the equally low price of a competitor without regard to the maintenance of customary price differentials.
ERWIN JAMES KEUP

Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act Held Not An AntiTrust Law-Plaintiff alleged that it was injured by defendant's
sales at unreasonably low prices, and that defendant's conduct violated
Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act. Plaintiff sued for treble
damages and injunctive relief under Section Four and Section Sixteen
of the Clayton Act, claiming that the defendant had violated an antitrust law. The United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision,
Held: that Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act was not an
anti-trust law, and the plaintiff, therefore, could not maintain under
Sections Four and Sixteen of the Clayton Act a private civil action for
treble damages and injunctive relief. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation
Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 352 (1958).
The above problem has been before the courts for the past twenty
years. Some decisions have agreed with the majority in the present
case and other decisions have sided with the dissenting opinion holding
that Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act is an anti-trust law.
Considering the importance of this issue and the amount of authority
on either side, it is surprising that the Supreme Court did not pass
on this sooner.
Section Four of the Clayton Act' permits one who is injured by
reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws to bring a suit for
treble damages, and Section Sixteen 2 of the Clayton Act allows the
claimant to obtain injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage
1 15 U.S.C. §15 (1914).
215 U.S.C. §26 (1914).
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by a violation of the anti-trust laws. It is plain, therefore, that these
private civil remedies are not available unless an anti-trust law is
violated.
The majority of the court ruled that the Robinson-Patman Act was
not an anti-trust law in its entirety, but that Section One of the Robinson-Patman Act was an anti-trust law, as Section One specifically states
that "Section Two of the Clayton Act is amended to read as follows
.3
The court reasoned that the lack of specific language referring
to the Clayton Act in Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act precluded that Section from affecting the Clayton Act and thus it was not
an anti-trust law.
Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act 4 prohibits three kinds of
practices: (1) general price discrimination, (2) geographical price discrimination, and (3) selling goods at unreasonable prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor. The first
two abuses, general price discrimination and geographical price discrimination, are also condemned by Section Two of the Clayton Act
which makes a violation of them subject to the private civil remedies
provided for by Sections Four and Sixteen of the Clayton Act. The
third abuse prohibited by Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act
is selling at unreasonably low prices to foreclose competitors and there
is no mention of this practice in the Clayton Act. The court deemed
this a significant factor in ruling that Section Three of the RobinsonPatman Act was not an anti-trust law. The end result is that price discrimination is criminally punishable under Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act and a violator is subject to civil liability to an individual under Section Two of the Clayton Act. One who sells at unreasonably low prices is subject only to the criminal penalties imposed
under Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The dissenting opinion failed to recognize a difference between
the three abuses prohibited by Section Three. If the discriminatory
practices condemned by Section Three were also violative of Section
349 STAT. 1528 (1936).
4 15 U.S.C. §13a (1936).

"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any
transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge
against competitors of the purchaser, in that any discount, rebate, allowance,
or advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any
discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available at the time
of such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of like
grade, quality and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of
the United States for the purpose of dsetroying competition, or eliminating a
competitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell,
goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or
eliminating a competitor.
"Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both."
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Two of the Clayton Act so that civil relief was permitted then "selling
at unreasonably low prices" should be placed in the same category as
it is also an unfair trade practice.
Until this decision the majority of lower courts sustained the contention that Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act was an antitrust law and allowed civil relief. 5 Most of these courts failed to distinguish between the effects of the various provisions of the RobinsonPatman Act and held that the Robinson-Patman Act was an anti-trust
law in its entirety. They considered "selling at unreasonably low prices
for the purpose of destroying competition" just as great an evil as price
discrimination, and provided the same remedy to an individual injured
by a violation of anything mentioned in the Robinson-Patman Act.
This line of reasoning is best expressed in the Balian Ice Cream case 6
where the court stated that the three main statutes dealing with monopolies and combinations are the Sherman Anti-trust Act, Clayton Act,
and the Robinson-Patman Act, and they are all closely related. Each
Act was enacted to curb conduct that the previous acts failed to prohibit. All three of the Acts aim to suppress combinations to restrain
competition and attempts to monopolize, and maintain the freedom of
commerce between the states. The treble damage provision was not
only to compensate an individual for loss as a result of one of the prohibited acts, but it also induces potential violators not to act contra to
the anti-trust laws, as the financial consequences are great.
The Supreme Court notes that the Justice Department has never
prosecuted an individual for a violation of Section Three. If private
civil remedies are not available to individuals, the policy of the Justice
Department will undoubtedly change, and violators of Section Three
will now be faced with criminal prosecution.
PAUL V.

LuCKE

Constitutional Law - Interpretation of the Smith Act - Fourteen defendants were charged with conspiring: 1) to advocate and
teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing the government of the
5The following held that private remedies were available for a violation of
Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act: Dean Oil Co. v. American Oil

Co., 147 F. Supp. 414 (1956) ; Atlanta Brick Co. v. 0' Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39

(1942); Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (1950); Hershel California

Fruit Products Co. Inc. v. Hunt Foods Inc., 119 F. Supp. 603 (1954) ; Balian
Ice Cream Co. Inc. v .Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (1950) ; Meyers v.
Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (1951) ; Kentucky-Tennessee Light and Power
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728 (1941); A. J. Goodman and Son
Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F Stpp. 890 (1949); Vance v. Safeway
Stores Inc.. 239 F. 2d 144 (1957).
The following cases held that Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act
was not an anti-trust law and prevented private relief: National Used Car
Market Report Inc. v. National Auto Dealers Association, 108 F. Supp. 692,
(1951) aff'd 200 F. 2d 359 (1952); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 238
F. 2d 86(
).
6 Balian Ice Cream Co. Inc- v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (1950).

